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THE ROAD FROM NOWHERE?
PUNITIVE DAMAGE RATIOS AFTER BMW v.
GORE AND STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE CO. v. CAMPBELL
Andrew C. W. Lund'

I.

INTRODUCTION
Since at least 1996 when the Supreme Court decided BMW

of North America, Inc. v. Gore,' lower courts' reviews of punitive
damage awards have officially included a review of the ratio
between the punitive award and the underlying compensatory
award. Yet, this ratio's role in these courts' analyses has often
been very weak. This was not necessarily a fault of BMW, which
was merely grounded in a concern for fair notice to defendants. In
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. C ~ m p b e l l , ~
however, that rationale changed, and with that change, the
weakness of ratios has become problematic.
In BMW, the Court reaffirmed that an excessive punitive
damage award may violate due process and, for the first time, held
that a punitive damage award's excessiveness violated due

-

-

'

B.A., 1999, with honors, Swarthmore College; J.D., 2002, cum laude, New
York University School of Law. I thank Bany Friedman, Margo Kaplan and
William Nelson for their comments and suggestions during the preparation of
this article. Special thanks to my wife, Anne, for all of her help and support.
5 17 U.S. 559 (1996).
538 U.S. 408 (2003).

'
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process.' Most famously, BMW set forth a non-exclusive list of
three "guideposts" to direct courts in their determinations of
unconstitutional excessi~eness.~ Among these three was the
reasonableness of the ratio between a punitive damage award and
the underlying compensatory award.6

Indeed, much of the

academic debate surrounding punitive damages, both before and
after BMW, concerned such ratio^.^ But despite the fact that BMW
described the ratio between punitive and compensatory awards as
an important part of the analysis, later judicial review of such
awards often overlooked or marginalized ratios.
This marginalization of ratios, far from being exogenous to
BMW, was a product of certain provisos of the "guidepost"
framework

the

case

established

for

determining

the

unconstitutionality of punitive damage awards. These provisos left
lower courts with the distinct impression that ratios between
punitive and compensatory damages were to be of little help in
determining excessiveness. Faced with these instructions, the ratio
guidepost was doomed to fail with respect to constraining punitive
4

See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994); TXO Prod. Corp. v.
Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499
U.S. 1 (1991); Browning-Ferris lndus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.
257 (1989).
5
See BMW, 5 17 U.S. at 575.
Id.
7
See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, The Predictability of
Punitive Damages Awards in Published Opinions, the Impact of BMW v. Gore
on Punitive Damage Awards, and Forecasting Which Punitive Awards Will Be
Reduced, 7 S. CT. ECON.REV. 59 (1999); Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages
and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO.L.J. 421 (1998); A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 1 1 1
HARV.L. REV. 869 (1998); Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal
L.J. 347 (2003).
Damages, 113 YALE
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awards.
Although the caveats often rendered ratios ineffective, that
ineffectiveness was not inconsistent with BMWs limited
constitutional concern - fair notice to defendants.

Justice

Stevens' majority opinion in BMW declared: "Elementary notions.
of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that
a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will
subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty
that a State may impose."'

But "fair notice" does not require

mathematical certainty or anything close to it.

Nor does it

necessarily mean that a jury may not be arbitrary or capricious in
'reaching its decision. Such was ratio's happy, albeit ineffective,
position after BMW.
The ineffectiveness of ratios only became problematic
when State Farm modified its underlying rationale, espousing the
more robust concept of "non-arbitrariness."

That modification

should have resulted in a stronger role for punitive-tocompensatory ratios, because the BMW guideposts, without a
strong concern for ratio, did not necessarily constrain juries'
arbitrariness. But State Farm failed to clearly break from those
provisos in BMW that had undercut ratios' power. As a result,
what had been merely an ineffective guidepost under BMW
metastasized into an internally inconsistent doctrine under State

Farm. Now, not only are lower courts after State Farm confused
with respect .to ratio's import, this confusion is, for the first time,
BMW, 5 17 U.S.at 574 (emphasis added).
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problematic vis-a-vis the underlying constitutional issue.
Part I1 offers a brief introduction to BMW and its immediate
aftermath. After the decision was handed down in 1996, scholars
found that punitive damage award ratios were still arbitrary. In
Part 111, one hypothesis given to explain this result - that not
enough time had elapsed since BMW to allow lower courts to come
to grips with its lessons - is examined and dismissed after
observing how post-BMW courts continued to give shape to the
guideposis well beyond 1996.

Part IV offers a different

hypothesis, which better explains why punitive damage awards
behaved arbitrarily. The cause of ratios' weakness lay in the BMW
guideposts themselves and in the Court's rationale of fair notice.
Part V describes State Farm and its relationship to BMW. State

Farm changed the Court's rationale for reviewing punitive
damages. This new rationale demanded a stronger ratio guidepost,
but State Farm did not formally distance itself from those parts of
BMIIY that had rendered the ratio guidepost impotent. This has
created a significant inconsistency in the Court's punitive damages
doctrine. Nevertheless, lower courts appear to be making their
way towards a more coherent punitive damages doctrine. In this
way, the practical effect of the rationale "sea change" has been
better realized than the jurisprudential one.

11.

BMW OF NORTHAMERICA,ZNC.

V.

GORE

As noted, BMW announced that ratio was to play a role in
determining excessiveness. The constraining nature of ratios led

Heinonline - - 20 Touro L. Rev. 946 2004-2005

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

20051

947

many to posit that punitive damage awards would behave
consistently after that decision.

But scholars soon discovered

inconsistency beyond that which had occurred pre-BMW. Ratio, a
guidepost that should have constrained punitive awards was not
necessarily doing its job and the other guideposts were helpless to
impose consistency on punitive awards.

BMW
In 1990, Dr. Ira Gore bought a new BMW from a
dealership in Alabama. He soon discovered that the car had been
repainted prior to his p ~ r c h a s e . ~It had been BMW's policy to
repair damaged-but-new cars and sell as "new" those cars whose
repair costs were less than three percent of their total value."
Gore's damaged car had fallen into this group, and, consequently,
BMW had sold the car to him without disclosing that it had been
repainted. 'I
Dr. Gore brought suit and an Alabama jury returned a
verdict in his favor for $4,000 representing the diminution in value
due to the repainting." The jury also awarded Dr. Gore $4 million
in punitive damages, in light of all the damage caused throughout
the United States by BMW's non-disclosure policy; Gore had
contended

at

trial

that

BMW

had

similarly

defrauded

approximately 1,000 customers throughout the United States.13
'Id.at 563.
'O Id. at 563-64.
" Id. at 564.
" Id. at 565.
l 3 BMW, 5 17 U.S.at 564.
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BMW appealed the award and the Alabama Supreme Court
ordered a remittitur of $2 million because the jury improperly
considered BMW's acts of sale and non-disclosure in jurisdictions
outside of Alabama."
The United .States Supreme Court held that even this
reduced award was unconstitutionally excessive. I S Justice Stevens'
opinion identified the constitutional problem as the absence of
notice to BMW of such a large punitive damage award,I6 while
Justice Breyer, in his concurrence, specifically described the
constitutional concern in terms of arbitrariness, that is, the absence
of

"

'reasonable constraints' within which [a jury's] 'discretion is

exercised.

7

7717

These two rationales are intertwined: any provision

of notice as to how or to what extent punitive damages will be
awarded, simply by so outlining the outer limits of punitive
damage awards, will have some effect on curbing a jury's
arbitrariness.
However,

"fair

notice"

and

"non-arbitrariness"

are

fundamentally different. They are respectively judged in relation
to two different groups of actors. The purview of fair notice is

Id. at 567.
Id at 573-74. The Court agreed with the Alabama Supreme Court that the
jury had improperly considered BMW's acts and omissions outside of Alabama.
It held that "a State may not impose economic sanctions on violators of its laws
with the intent of changing the tortfeasors' lawful conduct in other States." Id. at
572.
16
Id. at 574-75 ("Three guideposts, each of which indicates that BMW did not
receive adequate notice of the magnitude of the sanction that Alabama might
impose. . . lead us to the conclusion that [the award was excessive].") (emphasis
added).
17
Id. at 587 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20-21).
l4

15
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limited to a particular defendant - he or she is the one harmed by
the absence of such notice and his or her awareness of the punitive
possibilities is the dispositive issue.

An inquiry into non-

arbitrariness, on the other hand, is directed toward the decisionmaker, i.e., the jury. It is the jury's actions - its process - that
matter, not necessarily the effect that process may or may not have
on any defendant. According to Justice Breyer's concurrence, the
harm in arbitrariness is more globalized in the sense that capricious
awards damage respect for the legal system and not merely the
wallet of a particular defendant."
The practical difference between the two rationales lies in
the extra requirement non-arbitrariness places on decision-makers.
For example, a legislature might announce a range of possible
punishments, thereby placing a defendant on fair notice of his or
her liability. However, a rule of non-arbitrariness further requires
that the decision-maker reason its way within that range. Fair
notice, then, is often a by-product of non-arbitrariness, as nonarbitrary awards are more predictable.

But fair notice is not

sufficient by itself to provide for non-arbitrariness. Moreover, the
measures which may ensure fair notice, perhaps the establishment
of a range of possible awards, are not necessarily able to insure
non-arbitrariness.
From the concept of fair notice flowed BMWs three
"guideposts" to direct excessiveness analyses. First, courts were to

IS

BMW, 5 1 7 U.S. at 587 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20-

21).
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consider the reprehensibility of a defendant's c o n d ~ c t . ' On
~ this
count, BMW suggested punitive damages ought to "reflect 'the
enormity of [the] offense.'

"'O

The Court delineated a general

continuum of reprehensibility, with non-violent, negligent acts at
one end and violent, intentional acts at the other."

Later courts

were to consider whether the harm caused was physical or
economic; whether the plaintiff was financially vulnerable;
whether the tortiuous acts were isolated or recurring; and whether
the tort was intentional or ac~idental.'~Of particular interest, BMW
pronounced reprehensibility as "[plerhaps the most important
indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages a ~ a r d . " ' ~

The second BMW guidepost was the ratio of the punitive
award to the compensatory award.24 Specifically, the punitive
award was to bear some reasonable relationship to the "harm likely
to result from the defendant's conduct as well as the harm that
actually has oc~urred."'~BMW quickly cautioned, however, that
no "simple mathematical formula" could determine whether a
punitive award was con~titutional.~~
Finally, under the third guidepost, courts reviewing for
excessiveness were to consider the "civil or criminal penalties that

Id. at 575.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
2' Id. at 575-76.
Id. at 576.
23 B W , 517 U.S. at 575.
24 Id. at 580-8 1 .
Id. at 581 (emphasis omitted).
' 6 Id. at 582.
l9

O'

''
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could be imposed for comparable misc~nduct."'~Along this line,
reviewing courts were to

"

'accord 'substantial deference' to

legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the
conduct at issue. ,328
9

The Aflermath
After BMW, scholars eagerly waited to see what effect the
Court's

first

decision

holding a punitive

award

to

be

unconstitutionally excessive would have on punitive awards in
general. Professors Eisenberg and Wells conducted a study of
punitive damage awards during the period between May 1995 and
July 1997 (the BMW decision was handed down in May 1996).'9
They hypothesized that "punitive awards should be lower than
before BMW and that the ratio of punitive awards to compensatory
awards should have de~reased."~'
Surprisingly, Eisenberg and Wells found "no significant
difference in the pattern of awards before and after BMW and no
significant difference in the rate at which courts order a reduction
in punitive damages award^."^'

As expected, they found

"meaningful differences in the ratio of punitive to compensatory
awards."32 However, those differences occurred with respect to

Id. at 583.
28 B W , 517 U.S. at 583 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 30 1 ( 1 989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
*'See Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 7, at 63.
30 Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 7, at 6 1 .
3' Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 7, at 6 1 .
32 Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 7, at 61.
27
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low-ratio
increased.')

awards;

post-BMW,

high-ratio

[Vol20
awards

actually

The punitive awards were shifting toward their

respective ends of the ratio distribution - low ratios were getting
lower and high ratios were getting higher. What could account for
this polarization? Writing only one year after BMW,j4 Eisenberg
and Wells later reasonably posited: "[Ilt may be that not enough
time has elapsed for BMW to exercise significant influence on the
pattern of punitive award^."^'

As time has passed and courts

continued to accord little power to ratios, that explanation has
become less and less plausible.

If ratios played little or no constraining role in courts'
decisions, it would not be surprising that Eisenberg and Wells
found high ratios remaining high and ratios becoming polarized.
Their hypothesized consistency of ratios depended upon ratios
directing and constraining, to some extent, a court's ultimate
decision.

Left to their own devices, the first and third BMW

guideposts were likely to cause exactly the phenomena that
Eisenberg and Wells observed.36
Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 7, at 61.
Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Punitive Awards A j e r BMW, a New
Capping System, and the Reported Opinion Bias, 1998 W s . L. REV. 387 (1998).
In this earlier post-BMW study, Eisenberg and Wells noted that the "universe of
reported opinions . . . is systematically biased upwards." Id. at 409.
35
Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 7, at 61.
36
See Martin H . Redish & Andrew L. Mathews, Why Punitive Damages are
Unconstitutional, 53 EMORYL.J. 1, 12 (2004) ("Because of the inherent
vagueness of the criteria used to measure the constitutional validity of punitive
damages awards, lower courts employing those criteria have permitted punitive
damages awards that by most rational standards would likely be deemed
. dramatically excessive.") (footnotes omitted). Professor Redish and Mr.
Mathews find BMWs second guidepost to be inherently vague as well. They
note that State Farm's single-digit ratio was adopted as a "guiding rule of
33
34
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If

reprehensibility

were

the

criterion

on

which

excessiveness was determined, high ratios would likely remain
high." Juries give awards with high ratios in the first place when
acts are particularly offensive; they give awards with low ratios
when the acts are less so. When ratios are not taken into account,
therefore, reprehensibility can ,protect the award and the
corresponding punitive-to-compensatory ratio from judicial
scrutiny driven by otherwise constraining con~iderations.~~
Moreover, examination of comparable sanctions is hardly

an effective control. Most importantly, the third guidepost offers
little help in constraining punitive awards in cases where jail time
might be available because of the incommensurability of economic
So, for what are likely the most
sanctions and impris~nment.~~
thumb" to combat the dramatically excessive punitive awards that had been
allowed under BMW. Id. Their complaint with the single-digit rule of thumb is
that such an arbitrary mathematical formula "underscores the quasi-legislative
nature of the Court's constitutional doctrine." Id.
37
See, e.g., Steven L Chanenson & John Y. Gotanda, The Foggy Road for
Evaluating Punitive Damages: Lijiing the Haze from the BMWState Farm
J.L. REFORM 441, 443 (2004) ("The first guidepost,
Guideposts, 37 U . MICH.
concerning reprehensibility, remains amorphous. Because the Court did not
provide a clear set of criteria to determine whether a defendant's conduct
justifies a certain amount of punitive damages, applying this guidepost is highly
subjective and can lead to inconsistent decisions."); Stephanie L. Nagel, B W v.
Gore: The United States Supreme Court Overturns an Award of Punitive
Damages as Violative of the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, 7 1 TUL.L.
REV. 1025, 1039 (1997) ("[Tlhe only predictable cases are those that land at the
extremes of the reprehensibility scale.").
38 But see Chanenson and Gotanda, supra note 37, at 470 (noting that reliance
on ratios might also lead to inconsistent results because of the ease with which
ratios can be manipulated, particularly with respect to potential harm).
39 Chanenson and Gotanda, supra note 37, at 479-80 ("Comparing punitive
damages awards to non-monetary criminal punishments . . . would effectively
eviscerate the third guidepost because such punishments are not meaningfully
comparable to monetary fines. . . . Any nontrivial potential term of
imprisonment would likely justify almost any size punitive damages awards.").
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egregious cases, the third guidepost does no work in constraining
punitive damage awards.''

Furthermore, courts rarely apply the

'
the Court itself has expressed concern
third g ~ i d e p o s t . ~ Finally,
over the propriety of applying the third guidepost. In Stare Farm,
Justice Kennedy observed the disconnect between the standards of
proof required in civil versus criminal cases and noted "[plunitive
damages are not a substitute for the criminal process, and the
remote possibility of a criminal sanction does not automatically
sustain a punitive damages a ~ a r d . ' ' ~ '
In short, one should have expected that post-BMW ratios
would behave according to Eisenberg and Wells' expectations, i.e.
consistently, only if post-BMW courts were actually considering an
award's ratio or some other similarly constraining factor in their
analyses. But, as is discussed in the next section, lower courts
were not using the ratio guidepost in that way.

111.

THE SECOND~ U I D E P O S T BETWEENB M w
STATE FARM

AND

In fact, courts were often not using the ratio guidepost in
any meaningful way at all. Coupled with the weakly constraining
40 But see Chanenson and Gotanda, supra note 37, at 480-81 (contending that
the third guidepost should only look to criminal fines, rather than all criminal
punishments).
4 1 See, e.g., David Hogg, Alabama Adopts De Novo Review for Punitive
Damages Appeals: Another Landmark Decision or Much Ado About Nothing?,
54 ALA.L. REV. 223,232 (2002) (suggesting that resort to comparable sanctions
would provide clarity with respect to excessiveness analyses).
42 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 583 U.S. 408,428 (2003).
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first and third guidepost (which, as discussed, was not being used
very much either), the BMW framework was bound to produce
arbitrary punitive awards. A search of August 1997-April 2003
cases found over 300 decisions in which courts reviewed punitive
damage awards within the BMW framework.43 In these cases,
courts rather consistently found the ratio guidepost to be weak, i.e.,
they accorded the ratio guidepost little or no weight at all. More
often than not, this discarding of ratios was based upon either the
subordinate role ratios were required to play in excessiveness
analyses or the futility that many courts believed necessarily
characterized any analysis driven by such a mathematical tool.
At the outset, it is important to lay out what it means for a
guidepost to be "weak" or "strong."

In the extreme case, it is

possible that a court might find one guidepost to be decisive. The
court might determine that because of considerations of
reprehensibility, ratio or comparable sanctions alone, a decision
necessarily follows regarding the constitutionality of a punitive
damage award. For instance, the first guidepost might be strong if,
despite an apparently unreasonable ratio and no comparable
sanctions, an award was upheld on the grounds that the act was so
despicable as to merit extraordinary punishment.
A lesser version of one guidepost's strength would be the
following example: Imagine a court basing its ruling on a
43 These cases ranged from state appellate courts to federal district and appellate
courts. At least one study found "no substantial evidence of significant
differences in the treatment of the punitive-compensatory ratio by state and
federal courts or by [federal] district courts, and [federal] courts of appeals."
Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 34, at 4 10.
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guidepost when it is not clear in which direction the others point.
In the case of a moderately reprehensible act and a ratio that is on
the border of reasonableness, the third guidepost might be strong
if, on the ground that no similar sanctions existed in criminal or
civil

law, the

court

struck

down an

award as

being

unconstitutionally excessive.j4
On the other hand, it would seem as though a guidepost
was weak if a court recognized that it cut in favor of or against an
award, but ruled in the opposite fashion. For example, imagine a
court recognizing that a ratio was exceptionally high, but ruling the
award constitutional because the defendant's reprehensibility was
great and there existed comparable sanctions. It would be sensible
to say that the second guidepost was weaker than the sum of the
other two. Of course, the last example should strike most people
as not necessarily valuing one guidepost less than any other.
Instead, it may be that the sum of the other guideposts simply
trumped the single.
Along this line, it might be the case that one guidepost
trumps two others, leading to the conclusion that the two are
relatively weak. But such a conclusion may be based on one
guidepost so strongly pointing in one direction as to overcome the
marginal guidance provided by the other two. Of course, this does
not mean that the court has failed to ascribe equal importance to
the other two guideposts. Instead, it merely indicates that the
-

--

--

44

This is similar to the proposal of Chanenson and Gotanda. See supra note 37
and accompanying text.
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guidance provided by the two guideposts, taken together, is not as
strong as the single one in that particular case.
With this in mind, it is safe to say that the majority of post-

BMW cases exemplified a trend among many courts to accord little
or no weight to ratio. And, as mentioned, this lack of gravity was
occasioned by two considerations.
In many cases, ratio explicitly played a subordinate role.
For example, in Rahn v. Junction City Foundry, Inc.,4 5 a federal
district court in Kansas upheld a $30,000 punitive damage award.46
It mentioned all three of the BMW guideposts, beginning with the
first and the third.47 Affer concluding that the defendant's acts
were reprehensible and that comparable sanctions existed, the
court ruled: "[dlefendant had fair notice that it could be exposed to
Conspicuously, it did
punitive damages in the circurnstance~."~~
not find'that the defendant was also on notice as to the possible
punitive to compensatory ratio. Instead, the court held, without
further discussion and in a separate passage, that the ratio "[was]
not unconstitutionally disprop~rtionate."~~
Rahn could not have been "disproportionate" because the
defendant was aware that ratios might be that high." AS noted, the
Rahn court never indicated that there were other cases that put the
defendant on notice of a 30 to 1 ratio or that 30 to 1 was otherwise

161 F. Supp. 2d 12 19 (D. Kan. 2001).
46 Id. at 1243.
47 Id. at 1244.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 1245.
'O Rahn, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 1244.
45
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within the range of punitive damage liability likely to be expected
by

a defendant.

Instead, the

ratio

was

deemed

"not

unconstitutionally disproportionate" because the case was not one
of "purely economic injury.""

The determination on the point of

reprehensibility (and perhaps comparable sanctions), that the injury
went beyond the "economic," simply eviscerated the need to even
examine the ratio.
Furthermore, in Seitzinger v. Trans-Lux Corp., the New
Mexico Supreme Court upheld a $400,000 punitive award (26 to 1
ratio) in a sexual harassment case.52 First, the court held that the
defendant's actions were reprehensible enough to warrant a
significant punitive damage award.53 It went on to simultaneously
address the second and third BMW guideposts:
Here the ratio is twenty-six to one. We generally
agree the ratio is high. But, is it too high?
[Defendant] notes that no New Mexico employment
termination case has upheld a punitive damage ratio
of this magnitude. [Defendant] also reminds us . . .
that, "if the damages are significant and the injury
not hard to detect, the ratio of punitive damages to
the harm generally should not exceed ten to one."
[Defendantl's observations are accurate as far as
they go, but they do not resolve the issue.54
The court continued by observing that the public policy
against sexual harassment was so strong it could not "say as a

" Id.

''

at 1245.
No. 20678, 2001 WL 1748893, at *12 (N.M. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2001)

(unpub'd).
53 Id. at $11-12.
54
Id. at $12.
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matter of law that the ratio is too high.''"

959

Although the ratio was

"high" and no comparable sanctions existed in case law, the court
still refused to deem the award excessive.j6
Such instances of reprehensibility defeating ratio were
common. In State Compensation Insurance Fund v. WPS, Inc.,57 a
California court determined that the defendant's "willful[]
perpetrat[ion of] a fraud on a company serving the public need of
providing workers' compensation insurance" was reprehensible.''
As for the second guidepost, the court ruled that "the ratio of 14 to
1 . . . is not excessive given the ongoing fraudulent conduct
engaged in by W P S . " ~ ~ In Wightman v. Consolidated Rail

or^.,^'

the Ohio Supreme Court upheld a $15 million punitive

damage award, an award
compensatory award.61

6,250 times greater than

the

The dispaiity was not inappropriate,

according to the court, "because a punitive damages award is more
about a defendant's

behavior than the plaintiffs

10~s."~~

Moreover, the actual damages had "little to do with how a jury

Id.
Id. See Axen v. Am. Home Prod. Corp., 974 P.2d 224, 243 (Or. Ct. App.
1999) (stating that the state had a strong interest in preventing catastrophe,
though the risk of such an event was low).
57 B116419, 2001 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2458, at $1 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 22,
2001) (unpub'd).
58 Id. at $50.
59
Id. Briefly discussing the third guidepost, the court found that WPS was on
notice of the possibility of the punitive damage award because "fraud has been a
predicate for imposing punitive damages since . . . 1872!" Id. The court ignored
the idea, enunciated in B M , that it is notice concerning the amount of punitive
damages that drives the constitutional analysis.
60 715 N.E.2d 546 (Ohio 1999).
6 1 Id. at 55 1-52.
62
Id. at 553.
55
56
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might effectively and fairly punish and deter Conrail's cond~ct."~'
In both cases, ratios could hardly have been more meaningless.
Indeed. Wightman came close to saying just that when it candidly
announced: "We see the ratio between the compensatory and
punitive

damages as less relevant here because

of the

egregiousness of the act."63
The elevation of reprehensibility to a position above ratio
was not the only problem for the ratio guidepost.

The

impossibility of mathematical certainty with respect to what was a
permissible or impermissible ratio also drove courts to simply
disregard ratios entirely. In Daka, Inc. v. Breiner.,65the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a $390,000 punitive
award, an award 39 times the compensatory award. The court
admitted that such a ratio might give cause for suspicion. The
court reasoned "the Supreme Court in TXO upheld an award of
$19,000 in compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive
damages, a ratio of more than five hundred to one. . . . In [BMW],
on the other hand, the Court reversed . . . a ratio of five hundred to
one."66 When read together, Daka said, these cases reaffirmed that
no mathematical bright line exists that fits every case.67 That is the
last reference to ratio made in the opinion. The futility of finding a
bright line apparently meant that ratio contributes nothing to the
excessiveness analysis.
Id.
Id. at 554.
65 71 1 A.2d 86 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
66
Id. at 101.
67 Id.
63
64
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The Sixth Circuit offered a prime example of this futilitydriven position. In Jeffries v. Wal-Mart,68the court upheld a 50 to
1 ratio between compensatory and punitive awards. The court did

not discuss the first or third guideposts, but did explain its
interpretation of the second guidepost. The court cited BMW for
the proposition that a high ratio, even 500 to 1 will not, by itself,
offend constitutional due process.69 What force a 50 to 1 or 500 to
1 ratio might have upon the analysis was left unclear, as the court

succinctly announced "Wal-Mart's

argument has failed to

convince
Judge Bell, in his dissent, addressed each of the guideposts.
He wrote that the defendant's actions were not so reprehensible as
to warrant a $425,000 punitive a ~ a r d . ~After
'
comparing the
punitive award to the "actual

[I

damages suffered by the plaintiff

plus the harm likely to result from defendant's action," Bell found
nothing to indicate a reasonable relati~nship.~'In addition, there
were no criminal sanctions for the defendant's conduct and
punitive damage awards for retaliatory discharge actions were
capped at the lev& of $300,000 by C ~ n g r e s s . ~ '

Jefferies, then, is an example of the ratio guidepost's
weakness to the extent that ratio was unable to have any effect on

15 Fed. Appx. 252 (6th Cir. 2000) (unpub'd).
Id. at 266.
70 Id.
71
Id. at 267 (Bell, J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 270.
73
Jej'iries, 15 Fed Appx. at 270 (Bell, J., dissenting) (citing 42 U.S.C.
198a(b)).
69
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\+-hatwas apparently a blank slate. Gii~ena relatively high ratio,
the majority did not feel compelled to strike the award down.
However, the court did not refute the claim that the ratio was high.
stating only that a high ratio by itself would not offend due
process, and when the "ratio is a breathtaking 500 to 1 . . . the
award must surely 'raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow.'- ,:74 This
implied that one or both of the other guideposts counseled
upholding the award. But, as described in Bell's dissent, Jefferies
would appear to be a case where the first and third guideposts
were: in the majority's mind, neutral.

And in the absence of

direction from the other guideposts, the court could not conclude
that a 50 to 1 ratio was dispositive. Absent such direction, one is
left to wonder what import a ratio could possibly have.
Courts also fail to take the second guidepost seriously even
when overturning punitive damage awards or ordering remittitur.
In Fall v. Indiana University Board of trustee^,^^ the court noted
the futility of using ratio more bluntly when remitting a punitive
award that was 155 times the amount of the compensatory award.
The court noted: "The rather fact-specific nature of the ratio
guidepost appears to limit this factor's importance in reviewing the
excessiveness of a damage a ~ a r d . " ' ~The ratio guidepost had been
rendered utterly impotent by the fact that no bright line existed.

74

Id. at 266 (quoting BMW, 5 17 U.S. at 583) (internal citations omitted).
33 F. Supp. 2d 729 (N.D. Ind. 1998).
76
Id. at 746. See Progressive Motors v. Frazier, 220 B.R. 476 (Bankr. D. Utah
1998). B M W s rejection of a categorical approach led to the conclusion that
"there is no set rule on the amount of punitive damages that may be imposed."
Id. at 479.
75
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,

Not only were extreme ratios unimportant to courts, but an
apparently reasonable ratio did little to save punitive damage
awards. In 2660 Woodley Road Joint Venture v. ITT S h e r ~ t o na, ~ ~
federal trial court in Delaware reduced a punitive damage award of

$37.5 million notwithstanding the fact that it was only three times
the compensatory award. The court found that the defendants'
actions were not so reprehensible as to warrant the large punitive
damage award.78 On the other hand, with respect to the third
guidepost, the court found that the defendants had "notice that their
questionable conduct could result in the imposition of a substantial
financial penalty."79 Finally, the cburt addressed the 3 to 1 ratio:
"the proper inquiry for considering the reasonableness of the ratio
between compensatory and punitive damages is 'whether there is a
reasonable relationship between the punitive damages and the

harm
likely to result from the defendant's conduct as well as the
..
harm that actually occurred. ,780 In deciding whether the ratio was
Y

reasonable, the court shifted its focus to the fact that deterrence
was unnecessary in the defendant's case."

The result in 2660

Woodley Road - that a 3 to 1 ratio was unreasonable - seems, at

NO. 97-450-JJF, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 439, at *1 (D. Del. January 10,
2002).
78 Id. at *20.
79 Id. at *26. The court based this finding on the fact that defendants realized a
profit of over $68 million from the contract upon which the fraud action was
based. Id.
Id. at *22-23 (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 581).
81
Id. at *23-24 ("Further, in the Court's view, a reduced punitive damages
award would still serve a deterrent function while comporting more with the
boundaries of punishment warranted by the conduct in this case.").
77
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the very least, a strange result given that other ratios far in excess
of treble damages have been upheld."
In all of these cases of weak ratios it is difficult to imagine
courts ruling differently had the ratios been more extreme, or, in
the cases like 2660 Woodley Road, less so. The reasonableness of
the ratio was of little or no importance to the ultimate resolution of
the excessiveness inquiry.

Whether it was because other

considerations were more important or because there was simply
no workable way of applying the ratio guidepost. a third of BlWVs
analysis was often being disregarded."

'' See also Gray v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 948, 959 (W.D. Mo.
1999) (stating that an award which corresponded to a 5 to I ratio was excessive,
while one that resulted in a 2 to 1 ratio was not).
83 There was a minority of cases in which the ratio guidepost was strong. See,
e.g., Rubinstein v. Adm'rs Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 408 (5th Cir.
2000) ("Having found that the award fails to satisfy the second requirement, we
need not examine the third prong of the BMW test."); Murray v. Solidarity Labor
Org. Int'l Union Benefit Fund, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1153 (N.D. Iowa 2001);
Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Brown, 832 So. 2d I, 24 (Ala. 2001) ("In light of the fact
that Brown's total compensatory damages amount to no more than $60,000, we
conclude that her punitive damages should amount to no more than $1 80,000.");
Kent v. White, 559 S.E.2d 731, 739 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002), stating:
When the ratio of 13.58 to 1 of [defendantl's actual damages
to punitive damages is compared to the punitive damages
average ratios for other individuals, such ratio is much lower
at 4.67 to 1. But when [defendantl's ratio is compared to the
corporate average of 12.6, [it] even exceeds the corporate
average.
Thus, the punitive damages returned against
[defendant] under a Gore analysis are grossly excessive
punishment. . . .
Notrica v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89, 118 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)
(ordering a new trial on punitive damages unless the plaintiff agreed to a
reduction of the award, so that the punitive-to-compensatory ratio would be
approximately 10 to 1; and therefore, within a presumptively constitutional
range).
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THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM
- THE ROAD TO
NOWHERE
These cases, some decided well after the Eisenberg and

Wells' study, point to a more systematic cause of the phenomenon
they had discovered. The cause of the ratio guidepost's weakness
lay in RMW itself. Along this line, Justice Scalia wrote a stinging
dissent in BMW.84 In it, he challenged a number of the majority's
conclusions. Most importantly for the issue at hand, he suggested
that the guideposts "mark a road to nowhere; they provide no real
guidance at all."85

In particular, Justice Scalia complained that

"[tlhe Court has constructed a framework that does not genuinely
constrain, that does not inform . . . lower

While perhaps

a road to nowhere, the guideposts were unable to constrain
punitive damage awards because they were not designed to
constrain. In this way, BMW was not wrongly decided, nor was
the framework it created not up to the challenge. In fact, the
framework was up to the challenge - the absence of fair notice to
defendants - but that challenge simply did not require much
constraint.
It should have been no surprise that the ratio guidepost
failed to "genuinely constrain" awards, as BMW had specifically
instructed courts to place significant weight on reprehensibility as
the "most important" g~idepost.~'This sapped the ratio guidepost

84

BMW, 5 17 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

85

Id. at 605.
Id. at 606.
Id. at 575.

86

''
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of its ability to guide anything at all - courts simply "turned off
the road" after passing reprehensibility. Moreover, a reasonable
reading of BMW7s confusing rejection of bright-line tests led lower
courts to undervalue the ratio guidepost in other cases. That is,
even if courts got past reprehensibility to consider ratio, the latter
was often deemed a non-starter for determining excessiveness.
Thus, any constraining power that ratios may have had was
undercut by these two caveats.
These two provisos, though, were not inconsistent with
BMW insofar as the majority was primarily concerned with fair
notice. Reliance on reprehensibility arguably achieved fair notice
and no bright mathematical lines were needed to let defendants
know that they could be on a rather large punitive hook for
egregious acts.

Thus, the resulting impotence of the ratio

guidepost detailed above was not inconsistent with the rationale
underlying BMW.

The Primacy of Reprehensibility
When BMW announced the three guideposts, each appeared
to be an equal partner in determining excessiveness:
Three guideposts, each of which indicates that
BMW did not receive adequate notice of the
magnitude of the sanction that Alabama might
impose . . . lead us to the conclusion that the $2
million award against BMW is grossly excessive:
the degree of reprehensibility of the nondisclosure;
the disparity between the harm or potential harm
suffered . . . and [the] punitive damage award; and
the difference between this remedy and the civil
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penalties authorized or imposed in comparable

The opinion continued by noting that ratio was "perhaps [the] most
commonly cited indicium of an unreasonable or excessive punitive
damages award," and had "a long ~edigree."'~The majority noted:
"Our decisions . . . endorsed the proposition that a comparison
between the compensatory award and the punitive award is
signifi~ant."~~
BMW went so far as to note, referring to PacrJic
Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, that a 4 to 1 ratio was "close to" but
did not " 'cross the line into constitutional impropriety.
However,

the

majority

also

7

confusingly

,791

elevated

reprehensibility above the other guideposts by naming it the "most
important indicium of

Lower courts needed to

account for this instruction as to reprehensibility's primacy. The
Court did not give any indication, however, as to how much more
important, vis-6-vis the other two guideposts, this "most important"
one was to be. Because the Court's only statement on the issue
was that reprehensibility was generally more important than the
other two, any decision based on the extremity of a high ratio or
the absence of comparable sanctions risked remand that such court
had not heeded B W s instruction. This is not to say that BMW
explicitly forced ratios or comparable sanctions to be disregarded.

Id. at 574-75.
89 BMW, 517 U.S. at 580.
90
Id. at 581.
91
Id. (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23-24).
92 Id. at 575.

88
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Certainly, later courts were not clearly or obviously bound to allow
reprehensibility

to

run

roughshod

over those

guideposts.

Kevertheless, given the lack of direction from the Court, it was not
surprising that they often did.
Therefore, B M W was arguably being followed rather than
distorted in each case described in Part I11 where reprehensibility
overwhelmed ratio.

Of course, the notion of reprehensibility's

importance had been developed by the Court over time and was
not created by BMW.93 But because BMW purported to establish a
tripartite framework, the primacy of reprehensibility turned out to
be, at the very least, problematic with respect to the application of
all three guideposts.
Moreover,

there

is

reason

to

be

concerned

that

reprehensibility, standing apart from the other guideposts, does not
do much to constrain punitive awards. In his BMW concurrence,
Justice Breyer cautioned against the possibility of courts "mak[ing]
'reprehensibility' a concept without constraining force, i.e., to
deprive the concept of its constraining power to protect against
serious and capricious deprivation^."^' First, a jury's determination
of a defendant's reprehensibility is notoriously difficult for an
appellate court to review.95 Moreover, the punitive damage analog

Id. at 575-76 (citing cases).
BMW, 517 U.S. at 590 (Breyer, J., concurring). A defendant's wealth
"cannot make up for the failure of other factors, such as 'reprehensibility,' to
constrain significantly an award that purports to punish a defendant's conduct."
Id. at 59 1.
95
See Chanenson & Gotanda, supra note 37, at 467 n.165 and accompanying
text.
93
94
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of any particular level of reprehensibility is extremely murky.96
That is, even if a court can effectively review whether an act is
slightly or outrageously reprehensible, that determination's import
for computing punitive damage awards is unclear. Is there no limit
on the punitive damages available in the case of the outrageously
reprehensible act? Even when BMW established something of a
sliding scale of reprehensibility, it did not address this issue of
commensurability.

Ratios as Futile
Even had BMW said nothing about the relative importance
of reprehensibility or ratio, it still qualified prospective application
of the ratio guidepost so as to render it impotent. After describing
the importance of ratios, the opinion immediately stated: "Of
course, we have consistently rejected the notion that the
constitutional line is marked by a simple mathematical formula,
even one that compares actual and potential damages to the
punitive award."" The Court then specified that:
[Llow awards of compensatory damages may
properly support a higher ratio than high
compensatory awards, if, for example, a particularly
egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of
economic damages. . . . Higher ratios may also be
justified in cases in which the . . . non-economic
harm might have been difficult to dete~mine.'~

96 See, e.g., CASSR. SUNSTEIN
ET AL., PUNITIVE
DAMAGES:HOW JURIES
DECIDE
2 1 7 (2002).
'' B W , 5 17 U.S. at 582 (citations omitted).
98 Id.

Heinonline - - 20 Touro L. Rev. 969 2004-2005

TOUR0 L.4 W REVIEW

970

[Vol20

The conclusion to the Court's ratio discussion quoted Huslip's
directive that

"

.[w]e need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a

mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable
and the constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case.' '399
The first reason for rejecting a bright-line mathematical test
seems clear. The guidepost framework does not contemplate a
ratio as dispositive between the "constitutionally acceptable" and
the "constitutionally unacceptable." This kind of inter-guidepost
dominance would obviate the need for reprehensibility and
comparable sanctions. Not only does such a dominant guidepost.
appear inappropriate in light of the BlMW framework, but to the
extent one .guidepost was intended to become dominant, it was
reprehensibility and not ratio.
The turn away from ratio's dominance should hardly have
necessitated its irrelevance, though. Requiring an award's ratio to
be only one of three factors in determining the ultimate question of
unconstitutional excessiveness does not require a court to abstain
from passing judgment on a ratio's reasonableness. In this way, a
100 to 1 ratio might be unreasonable, but, at the same time, the
other guideposts may

strongly point toward

an award's

constitutionality.
Accordingly, a court should not treat the unreasonable ratio
as being dispositive of the constitutional issue. Along this line, it
makes sense to restrain ratio's power in those instances where its
probity is minimal, as in the cases where non-economic harm was

99

Id. at 582-83 (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18).
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significant or where actual damages were low."'

For instance, it

makes little sense to allow a corporation to avoid high punitive
damages by simply practicing discrimination against poorly paid
employees so as to cause only minor actual damages. The problem
with bright lines is not with mathematical exactitude in respect to
the isolated ratio guidepost, but rather, mathematical exactitude in
respect to the full excessiveness inquiry.
Yet, as discussed in Part 111, some courts interpreted
B W s rejection of bright lines as a statement of doubt concerning
the utility of ratios generally. Fall v. Indiana University Board of
Trustees made this point most clearly when it stated the "factspecific nature of the ratio guidepost appears to limit this factor's
importance in reviewing the excessiveness of a damage award.""'
This interpretation had merit. As noted, BMW was concerned with
the ability of ratio to dominate the other guideposts: "low awards
of compensatory damages may properly support a higher ratio than
high compensatory awards, if, for example, a particularly
egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic

darn age^.^"^'

Ratio

does not

necessarily

reprehensibility points in the other direction

-a

control

when

point consistent

with the discussion up to now. Nothing about that line from the
Court's opinion should have rendered ratios meaningless.

100

Some courts have read these caveats to a very broad degree. In Romano v.
U-Haul Int'l, 233 F.3d 655, 673 (1st Cir. 2000), the First Circuit upheld a 19 to
1 ratio because actual damages were "low7'; actual damages in that case were
$15,000.
lo' 33 F. Supp. 2d 729,746 (N.D. Ind. 1998).
'O2BMW,517 U.S. at 582.
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However. BIMW then noted: "A higher ratio may also be
justified in cases in which the . . . non-economic harm might have
been difficult to determine,"lo3rather than explicitly limiting ratio's
power to overwhelm considerations of reprehensibility. This may
be interpreted as an attack on the utility of ratios themselves.
Irrespective of how reprehensible an act was or whether there were
comparable sanctions available, this line from the opinion raised
questions as to whether a court could ever be confident that a ratio
between punitive and compensatory damages is good evidence as
to excessivenessyrather than a concern about the interplay between
ratio and the other guideposts. This concern strikes at the ratio
guidepost independently - how confident can a court be that the
compensatory damages it is using are the appropriate comparison?
This variability of what constitutes a "reasonable ratio" is
the best argument for the futility to which cases like Fall referred.
Such an argument does not mistake the restriction on the role ratios
were to play in determining excessiveness with doubt about the
possibility of determining whether a ratio is unreasonable in the
first place. However, even this more reasonable interpretation is
problematic. BMW only offered one example of when a ratio's
reasonableness might vary - the case of hard-to-evaluate noneconomic damages.lo4 While certainly a broad caveat in a world
where non-economic damages are frequently claimed by plaintiffs,
the doubt about the reasonableness of ratios in such cases should

Io3
Io4

Id.
Id.
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only go so far as the non-economic damages are difficult to
measure. What is less clear is whether there are other cases in
which a higher ratio may be justified. Nevertheless, and as the
relative complexity of the preceding discussion shows, it should
not have been surprising that some lower courts essentially read
the second guidepost out of BMW based on the impossibility of
evaluating the reasonableness of a ratio.

Arbitrariness versus Fair Notice
One could conclude that BMW and the impotent ratio
guidepost it created might have succeeded at achieving its stated
goal of placing defendants on fair notice of punitive liability; at the
very least, the marginalization of ratios did not necessarily
undermine fair notice. If the primacy of reprehensibility and the
rejection of mathematical bright lines found in BMW directly led to
the marginalization of ratio in later cases, these concepts
themselves reflected the limited nature of B W s due process
concern. As noted, the rationale behind BMUl' turned on the need
for fair notice'05- a goal relatively easy to achieve. To take the
extreme case, the government's announcement that punitive
damages are unlimited would arguably provide fair notice to
defendants to avoid committing horrific torts.
105

A criterion like

See id. at 574. "Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our
constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of
the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the
penalty that a State may impose." Id. "None of these statutes would provide an
out-of-state distributor with fair notice that the first violation . . . of its
provisions might subject an offender to a multimillion dollar penalty." Id. at
584.
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reprehensibility, one certainly not marginalized by B M T , provides
a sufficient amount in the way of notice. Putative tortfeasors are
placed on notice that their punitive damage liability will be
measured against a jury's opinion of their acts' egregiousness.
Moreover, it is fairly certain that fair notice does not require
mathematical exactitude. In this way, those aspects in BMW that
often caused ratios to drop out of the excessiveness equation were
not necessarily contrary to the concept of fair notice

If fair notice, as a rationale, can take or leave ratios as an
indicium of excessiveness, non-arbitrariness does not have that
luxury. For non-arbitrariness as a constitutional concern, one need
look no further than Justice Breyer's concurrence in BMW, in
which he observed that the actual concern giving rise to
constitutional limitations on punitive damage award amounts was
the caprice of the decision-maker.

Describing the need for

constitutional oversight, he said:
The reason [for such review] flows from the Court's
emphasis in Haslip upon the constitutional
importance of legal standards that provide
"reasonable constraints" within which "discretion is
exercised," that assure "meaningful and adequate
review by the trial court whenever a jury has fixed
the punitive damages," and permit "appellate
review [that] makes . certain that the punitive
damages are reasonable in their amount and rational
in light of their purpose . . . .,,lo6

--

106

Id. at 587 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20-21).
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According to Justice Breyer, the guideposts must ultimately
be able to function as "standards" and "constraints" on a jury's
decision-making.'07 He distinguished this basis from mere fair
notice: "Requiring the application of law, rather than a
decisionmaker's caprice, does more than simply provide citizens

notice of what actions may subject them to punishment; it also
helps to assure the uniform general treatment of similarly situated
persons that is the essence of law itself"'08
While "fair notice" might be satisfied through putative
defendants imagining a prospective jury's

view of their

reprehensibility, reprehensibility alone does not provide the
constraint necessary to "assure the uniform treatment of similarly
situated persons" so crucial to Justice Breyer's mind.'Og The
determination of reprehensibility is ultimately a subjective one,
particularly insusceptible of principled judicial review."O

As a

result, reprehensibility could not remain the most important
guidepost

once the underlying

rationale

shifted to non-

arbitrariness.
On the other hand, a strong ratio guidepost is not
necessarily required by non-arbitrariness. Principled decision-

107

BMW, 517 U.S. at 588 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 587 (emphasis added).
Io9 Id. According to Justice Breyer, for the Alabama Supreme Court to find that
there existed a reasonable relationship between $56,000 in actual damages and
$2 million in punitive damages - when the harm was economic and there
existed no evidence of continuing conduct - "is to empty the 'reasonable
relationship' test of meaningful content." Id. at 590. That conclusion would
seem equally applicable in light of the cases discussed in Part 111.
' l o Id. at 580-8 1.
'08
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making may be occasioned by any number of criteria.
Nevertheless, a bright mathematical line certainly constrains in the
fashion described by Justice Breyer. In particular, a bright line
goes further than most in assuring uniform general treatment of
similarly situated people.
The Court returned to punitive damages generally, and the
fair noticelnon-arbitrariness distinction specifically, in Cooper
Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc."' There, the Court
held that appellate review of excessive punitive damage awards
was to be conducted de novo."' In explaining why that standard of
review was appropriate, Justice Stevens, again writing the majority
opinion, touched on a number of considerations, inciuding the
relative institutional competencies of trial and appellate court^."^
But more importantly, he expanded the rationale for constitutional
limitations on punitive damage awards.

Cooper Industries

specifically cited to the passage in Justice Breyer's BMW
concurrence distinguishing between " 'simply provid[ing] citizens
notice of what actions may subject them to punishment [and] . . .
assur[ing] the uniform treatment of similarly situated persons. 7,114
3

After Cooper Industries, non-arbitrariness, not fair notice,
was the driving force behind review of punitive damage awards. It
was non-arbitrariness that had been missing from BMW, in which
the majority's reliance on fair notice had allowed the ratio

'" 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
'

Id. at 43 1.
Id. at 440.
114
Id. at 436 (quoting BMW, 5 17 U.S. at 587 (Breyer, J., concurring)).
l2
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guidepost to be undercut. Requiring non-arbitrariness by requiring
"standards"

and

"constraints"

necessarily

weakened

reprehensibility's position as the "most important indicium"
because reprehensibility, more than either of the other guideposts,
allowed room for subjectivity and jury arbitrariness.
Ratio, on the other hand, was less susceptible to fall sway
to a jury's ~ a p r i c e . " ~Though nuanced and fact-specific, ratio
allowed perhaps the most objective criterion among the three
guideposts

for

determining

excessiveness.

While

the

determination of what is and what is not an appropriate ratio is
obviously arbitrary at the policy-making level,"6 the ratio
guidepost's ability to be mathematically well defined in application
became an advantage when the Court's focus shifted from fair
notice to non-arbitrariness.

V.

STATEFARMMUTUAL
INSURANCE
Co. V. CAMPBELL
After Cooper Industries, and considering the post-BMW

tendency by lower courts to accord little weight to ratios, the
ground was fertile for a substantial restatement of the Court's
punitive damages doctrine. This restatement would be made in
State Farm.

The decision was grounded in the due process

concern for non-arbitrariness and, because of that re-evaluation,
But see Chanenson & Gotanda, supra note 37, at 443 (noting that ratios may

be manipulated).
'I6 See, e.g., Redish & Mathews, supra note 36, at 12.
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should have substantially changed BMWs lessons about both the
primacy of reprehensibility and the impossibility of mathematical
bright lines. Instead, Stute Farm equivocated between parroting
BMW's discussion of both provisos and an implicit restatement of
them.

Lower courts faced with this conflict since State Farm

appear to be surprisingly capable of utilizing the ratio guidepost.
The Decision
In 1981, Curtis Campbell tried to pass six vans on a twolane highway in Utah. "' In the process, he forced Todd Ospital, a
driver in the opposite lane, to veer off the road in order to avoid a
colli~ion."~Ospital lost control of the vehicle and struck another
vehicle operated by Robert S l ~ s h e r . " ~Ospital was killed and
Slusher was permanently disabled; Curtis Campbell and his wife
Inez were uninjured."'

Ospital's estate and Slusher sued

Campbell. Campbell's insurance company, State Farm, contested
liability, and declined to settle with both parties for $25,000 each,
which was the policy's limit.I2' State Farm assured the Campbells
that "their assets were safe, that they had no liability for the
accident . . . and that they did not need to procure separate
counsel.""'

At the subsequent trial, the Campbells' liability was

assessed at approximately $186,000; State Farm initially refused to

117

State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 583 U.S. 408, 412 (2003).
118 Id.
- ~ .
' I 9 ~ dat. 413.
lZOId.
I 2 l Id.
'22 State Farm, 583 U.S. at 413 (citation omitted).
-
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pay the $1 36,000 difference between the judgment and the policy's
$50,000 ma~imurn."~The Campbells retained their own counsel
and appealed the verdict.'24 During the appeal, the Campbells,
Ospital's estate and Slusher reached a settlement pursuant to which
the plaintiffs would not pursue their claims against the Campbells
personally and the Carnpbells would pursue a bad faith action
against State Farm, from which the majority of the proceeds would
go to Ospital's estate and S 1 ~ s h e r . l ~The
~ Utah Supreme Court
denied the Campbells' appeal of the action,lz6and State Farm paid
the whole judgment, including the amount over the Campbells'
policy limits.I2'
The Carnpbells then brought suit against State Farm
alleging bad faith, fraud and intentional infliction of emotional
distress.I2' State Farm contended its decision not to settle had been
an "honest mistake," but the Campbells introduced evidence
demonstrating the decision was part of a nationwide practice by
State Farm to cap insurance payouts.'29 The jury awarded the
Carnpbells $2.6 million as a compensatory award and $145 million
as a punitive award.I3O The trial court reduced both to $1 million
and $25 million, respectively, but the Utah Supreme Court

123

Id.

124 Id.

125 Id.

Slusher v. Ospital, 777 P.2d 437,438 (Utah 1989).
State Farm, 538 U.S. at 414.
12' Id.
'29 ~ dat. 414-15.
1301d.at415.
'26
12'
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reinstated the $145 nlillion punitive a\vard.I3'
The Supreme Coun re\.srsed that decision.!''

In the

majority opinion: Justice Kennedy. citing Justice Bre!.eras B.\fIiconcurrence, held that a punitive award could violate due process
if it imposed '-grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a
tortfeasor.""'

The constitutional concern at issue was -'the

imprecise manner in which puniti\.e damages systems are
administered.'""

a clear statement of the Court's turn from fair

notice to nan-arbitrariness. The Court went on:
We have admonished that "punitive damayes pose
an acute danger of arbitrary deprivation of property.
Jury instructions typically leave the jury with wide
discretion in choosing amounts" . . . . "The Due
Process Clause does not permit a State to classif).
arbitrariness as a virtue. Indeed, the point of due
process - of the law in general - is to allo~v
citizens to order their behavior.'""
Although fair notice was on the minds of the Srcitc Fcrrn~majority,
it was only fair notice as a product of non-arbitrariness.
However, the two second-level aspects of BrbfIT discussed
earlier - the primacy of reprehensibility and the futility of
establishing bright mathematical lines - posed difficulties for the
newly

clarified

rationale.
-

Regarding
~

~p

the
~

171

primacy

of

- - -

See Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.. 65 P.3d 1131. 1352 (L'tah
200 I ) .
I" Sfcire Farnr. 538 U.S. at 418.
id. at 4 16.
""Icl.at417.
.
;a>
Id. at 4 17- 18 (quoting Honda Motor Co. \ . Oberg. 5 12 U.S. 4 15.432 ( I9'i-l)
and Hosli,~,.499 U.S. at 59 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).

':'
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reprehensibility, State Farm made this point also when, quoting
from Justice Breyer7s BMUI' concurrence, it stated: " '[a
defendant's wealth] cannot make up for the failure of other factors,
such as 'reprehensibility,' to constrain significantly an award that
purports to punish a defendant's conduct.'

In this regard,

"reprehensibility" can be a troubling guidepost with respect to
arbitrariness vel non because it often provides little or no guidance
at all. As for "bright lines," such mathematical tests, whatever
their demerits on other grounds may be, are among the most
obvious ways to constrain arbitrariness.
Despite its tension with non-arbitrariness, State Farm did
not formally break with either second-level aspect. The opinion
reiterated that reprehensibility was the " 'most important indicium'
"

of a punitive award' s reasonableness. 13'

Similarly, the majority

again declined to "impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive
damages award cannot exceed."13'

136

Id. at 428 (quoting BMW, 5 17 U.S. at 591 (Breyer, J., concurring)).
State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419 (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 575). The Court
noted: "While we do not suggest there was error in awarding punitive damages
based upon State Farm's conduct toward the Campbells, a more modest
punishment for this reprehensible conduct could have satisfied the State's
legitimate objectives, and the Utah courts should have gone no further." Id. at
419-20. Particularly problematic was the jury's knowledge of and reliance on
State Farm's out-of-state practices in assessing punitive damages. Id. at 420-21.
Not only had some of that out-of-state conduct been lawful where it occurred,
but, noting the possibility of multiple recoveries, State Farm also held due
process did not permit punishment of a defendant based on hypothetical claims.
Id. at 423. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 572.
13' State Farm, 538 U . S . at 425.
137
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Yet State Farm left little doubt that at least one of these
issues was to be significantly reshaped.

Immediately afier

rejecting a "bright-line ratio," the majority stated:
Our jurisprudence and the principles it has now
established demonstrate . . . that, in practice, few
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between
punitive and compensatory damages, to a
significant degree, will satisfy due process. . . . The
[BMW] Court . . . referenced a long legislative
history, dating back over 700 years and going
forward to today, providing for sanctions of double,
treble, or quadruple damages to deter and punish.
While these ratios are not binding, they are
instructive. They demonstrate what should be
obvious: Single-digit multipliers are more likely to
comport with due process, while still achieving the
State's goals of deterrence and retribution, than
awards with ratios in range of 500 to 1, or, in this
case, of 145 to 1.
Thus, State Farm not only established that a numerical test could
be used in respect of a ratio's reasonableness vel non, it established
a mathematical line for the entire excessiveness decision that
courts would have to justify crossing.
In doing so, State Farm appeared to significantly change
the way in which lower courts were to deal with ratios. Not only
did the opinion place the presumptive cap on ratios at 9 to 1, it
went on to specifically describe cases in which deviation from the
single-digit rule would be appropriate: those cases where

"

'a

particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small. amount of

139

Id. (internal citations omitted).

Heinonline - - 20 Touro L. Rev. 982 2004-2005

PUNITIVE D A M GES

20051

983

economic damages' " or where " 'the injury is hard to detect or the
monetary value of noneconomic harm might have been difficult to
determine. ,¶I40 Noticeably, these were exactly the situations
3

offered for variation by BMW. But coupled with the single-digit
presumption established by State Farm, these situations had
arguably become exceptions to the rule, rather than evidence that
no rule could possibly exist. In fact, the 9 to 1 "bright line"
provided such solid footing for defendants to contend that higher
ratios violate due process that Justice Ginsburg's State Farm
dissent challenged the "numerical controls" as "boldly out of
order."'41 State Farm's take on the primacy of reprehensibility was
cloudier.

As noted, State Farm continued to recognize

reprehensibility as

"

'[tlhe most important indicium of the

reasonableness of a punitive damages award.'

"I4'

Indeed, the

majority devoted a sizable portion of the opinion to discussion of
why the evidence provided below did not show particularly
reprehensible conduct,143and why the evidence that did was
beyond the scope of the Carnpbells'

Undoubtedly,

reprehensibility remained important to the analysis.

BMW, 5 17 U.S. at 582).
Id. at 438 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
14' Id. at 419 (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 582).
143 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419-20.
[W]e must acknowledge that State Farm's handling of the
claims against the Campbells merits no praise. . . . While we
do not suggest there was error in awarding punitive damages
based upon State Farm's conduct toward the Campbells, a
more modest punishment for this reprehensible conduct could
have satisfied the State's legitimate objectives . . . .
Id. at 422.
140 Id. (quoting
141
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Yet, in an important way, State Farm subordinated
reprehensibility to ratio. No matter how egregious the defendant's
act, State Farm established a presumptive 9 to 1 limit with respect
to a ratio's rea~onab1eness.l~~
Moreover, State Farm equated this
presumptive cap on a ratio's reasonableness with a general cap on
an award's excessiveness. In this way, the decision made ratio the
initial consideration in any excessiveness analysis, one whose
qualifications appear specific and enumerated. Reprehensibility
could overcome the presumption

,,

'where a particularly egregious
act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages. ,9146
"

7

But no matter how egregious the act, "[wlhen compensatory
damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to
compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due
process guarantee. "I4'

After State Farm, ratio seemed to be in the

driver's seat, and, while it remained the "most important indicium"
in name, reprehensibility's effect on excessiveness analysis
appeared severely constrained.

Post-State Farm Cases
The question remaining after State Farm, though, was

For a more fundamental reason, however, the Utah courts
erred in relying upon [State Farm's similar out-of-state
conduct] and other evidence: The courts awarded punitive
damages to punish and deter conduct that bore no relation to
the Campbells' harm.
A defendant's dissimilar acts,
independent from the acts upon which liability was premised,
may not serve as the basis for punitive damages.
145 Id. at 425.
146
Id, (quoting BMW, 5 17 U.S. at 582).
14' Id.
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whether the Court's reluctance to formally and forcefully depart
from the qualifications to the ratio guidepost might cause, or at
least allow, lower courts to disregard the shift in rationale and
continue to generally disregard the ratio guidepost. The short-term
and mostly anecdotal answer is that lower courts have adapted
surprisingly well to the muddled state of affairs left by State Farm.
These courts are vigorously using the ratio guidepost to constrain
punitive damage awards, in line with a concern for nonarbitrariness.
Take, for example, McClain v. Metabolife International
'

Inc. ,14' in which a number of plaintiffs were awarded compensatory
awards and punitive awards arising from the defendant's sale of
diet pills.

One of the seven plaintiffs punitive award ratio

exceeded 9 to

The district court first noted it had "hoped that

State Farm would provide help for ruling on [defendantl's claim
that the punitive damages imposed in these cases are excessive.
Now the court is not sure that the ,wait was worth it."'50 Still,

McClain observed that "State Farm begins to provide real help"
when discussing ratios and the presumptive 9 to 1 lirnit.l5' Based
solely on that presumptive limit, McClain limited those awards
whose ratios exceeded 9 to 1 to that ratio and left alone all other

259 F. S u p p 2d 1225 (N.D. Ala. 2003).
Id. at 1231. McClain did not decide whether another plaintiffs ratio was 7.5
to 1 or 75,000 to a nominal amount, instead holding, pursuant to State Farm,
that even in the latter case, the punitive award would have been justified because
of the miniscule nature of the compensatory award. Id. at 1235.
150 Id. at 1228-29.
151
Id. at 1230. See id. at 123 1 (describing State Farm S ratio analysis as "the
most potent ingredient in the witch's brew").
14'

'49
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punitive awards whose ratios were below 9 to l . I S 2
Ratio as a constraint on jury caprice was clearly on the
mind of the district court in Eden Electrical, Ltd. v. Amana Co..

L.P., in which the ratio for a purely economic injury was 8.5 to
1.IS'

The court began by observing, ''after [BMW] and State Fili-m,

the [punitive damage] award probably cannot exceed a 10-to-1
r a t i ~ . " " ~It explained:
Specifically, this Court reads State Farm to mean
that even where all the reprehensible considerations
are present, but where con~pensatorydamages are
significant, the punitive damages award cannot
ordinarily exceed the 1040-1 ratio and still be
constitutional. Thus, even where a plaintiff has
suffered a physical harm as a result of a recidivist
defendant's intentional and malicious disregard for
the health and safety of others, and the defendant
targeted his victim because the victim was
financially vulnerable, still that plaintiffs punitive
damages award could probably not constitutionally
exceed the 10-to-1 ratio. When the Court compares
the punitive damages award in the instant case (an
economic harm case) to this hypothetical case,
surely it must conclude that the Plaintiffs 8.5-to-1
ratio award is constitutionally e x c e s s i ~ e . ' ~ ~
Obviously, ratio is the most important indicium of excessiveness
under Eden Electrical's analysis. No matter the reprehensibility,
ratio controls so long as the compensatory award was substantial
enough to make ratio meaningful in the first place.
at 1235.
258 F. Supp. 2d 958,974 (N.D. Iowa 2003).
Id. at 973.
Id. at 974.

15* Id.
153

'54
15'
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Even courts that question the perspicacity of State Farm
have recognized its instruction that ratios are supposed to play a
greater role in excessiveness analyses than they had previously. In
TVT Records v. Island Def J a m Music

the court was

presented with a number of punitive damage awards, each of
which had a ratio below 9 to 1.I5' The opinion was careful to tread
lightly on the ground tilled by State Farm, noting "the Supreme
Court's instructions on [the ratio] point still appear somewhat
imprecise" and that "these [ratio] guidelines are far from firm and
crystal-clear, and may be read by adverse litigants to accommodate
their diametric proposition^."'^' The court continued, stating:
It is not the task of this Court to reconcile the
extremes that still formative Supreme Court
guidance conceivably might accommodate . . . . It
suffices to say that whatever vagueness and tensions
State Farm seems to reflect, to this Court the
ruling's higher frequencies are quite audible; the
notes resonate loud and clear concerns signaling
that, at least under the circumstances the case at
hand presents, the damages awards that prevail
should register at the lower end of the ~ c a 1 e . l ~ ~

The court concluded that because the compensatory awards
reflected "complete compensation," even the sub 9 to1 ratios were
unreasonable.

'" 279 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Id. at 449.
"'Id. at 449,450.

15'

'59
I6O

Id. at 450.
Id. at 450-5 1 (citing Stare Farm, 538 U.S. at 424).
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These cases and others have heeded State Farm's guidance
that punitive awards should not exceed nine times the amount of
compensatory damages except in certain well-defined cases.16' The
absence of a bright line mathematical rule that had caused earlier
courts to simply disregard ratios has been placed back into the
context that certain cases of nominal or meager compensatory
damages will require larger ratios. Moreover, these cases show
that the titular position reprehensibility still holds as the "most
important indicium" has been practically disregarded as lower
courts move more towards a ratio-based doctrine.

VI.

THEROADTO SOMEWHERE?
The weakness of the ratio guidepost after BMW was

obvious after even a cursory review of punitive damage opinions.
This weakness was caused by specific second-level provisos in the

BMW opinion that qualified ratios' applicability to such an extent
as to render it meaningless. Largely because of this weakness of
ratio, the BMW guideposts could truly have been said to mark a
road to nowhere. However, that result was not terribly inconsistent
with the BMW Court's concern for mere fair notice. On the other
hand, when the Court shifted its focus from fair notice to nonarbitrariness, those second-level aspects and the weak ratio
guidepost they created became problematic. The shift in rationale
occurred in Cooper Industries and State Farm, but it was the latter
161

See, e.g., Lincoln v. Case, 340 F.3d 283, 293-94 (5th Cir. 2003); Diamond
Woodworks, Inc. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 736, 761-62 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2003).
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that began to concomitantly change the second-level provisos that
had caused ratio's weakness and produced tension with the
principle of non-arbitrariness.
However, those second-level changes in State Farm were
'

baby steps - for primacy of reprehensibility, any change was
entirely implicit. Plainly, the Court has yet to explicitly do that
which it has done implicitly: eschew those qualifications for ratios
in favor of a more robust ratio guidepost. As a result, State Form's
effect on the primacy of reprehensibility and the impossibility of
mathematical bright lines, and therefore on the ratio guidepost
.

.

itself, is very much up for grabs.

However, the shift from

reprehensibility to ratio and from a reluctance to establish bright
.

numerical lines to a fairly straightforward single-digit test is
necessary if the Court is to remain concerned with non-

.

arbitrariness instead of fair notice. Post-State Farm courts appear
.

to have gotten the message despite the Court's inability to formally
break with or redefine either notion. Only time will tell, but if
State Farm proves unable to constrain capricious jury awards, it is
likely that the analysis that Justice Scalia called the "road to
nowhere" and "insusceptible of principled appli~ation"'~~
will
again come before the Court and force a clear choice between
reprehensibility and a distrust of bright-line tests on the one hand
and ratio and a defined numerical criterion, however nuanced, on
the other.

'61

State Form, 538 U.S. at 429 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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